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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the trial court err reversibly in overruling
Defendant's objection to the Court's sua sponte addition of the
words "or should have known" to the statutory language (previously
agreed upon by both court and counsel) of the instruction on the
elements of the crime of Theft by Receiving?
Did the trial court err in convicting Manuel Paez when the
State had failed to prove each element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt?

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
MANUEL PAEZ

Ca^e No. 870179-CA

Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment against Manuel Paez for
one count of Theft by Receiving, a Class A misdemeanor.

A jury

found Mr. Paez guilty at the conclusion of a one-day trial on May
5th, 1987.

On June 8, 1987, Mr. Paez was sentenced to serve 120

days in jail.

The jail was stayed upon Mr. Paez's successful

completion of one year good behavior prooation.

The terms of this

probation are that Mr. Paez commit no crimes, that he pay $239.00 in
restitution, and that he pay a $350 fine.

This sentence was imposed

in the Fifth Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, by the Honorable Floyd H. Gowans, Judge.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On the evening of March 28, 2987, Manuel Paez and his wife
were dinner guests at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Felix Amaguer (T.56)
In the course of the evening, a person known to Appellant only as
Felipe, also a dinner guest, approached Mr. Paez asking for a ride
to Felipe's home (T. 57). Felipe indicated that he wanted to pick
something up and return with this item to the dinner party (T. 58).
This conversation was overheard by other guests (T. 59).
Directed by Felipe, Mr. Paez drove to an apartment building
located at or near 2809 South 300 East in Salt Lake County, Utah (T.
59).

Mr. Paez waited at the car for Felipe, who returned with a

video cassette recorder in his arms.
There is no evidence in the record contradicting Mr. Paez's
version of the facts up to this point, although the facts of the
remainder of the incident are disputed.

Mr. Paez testified that

Felipe, pursued by another man, ran to the fence at the back of the
apartments and threw the video cassette recorder over onto the
sidewalk before climbing the fence himself and escaping (T. 63).
Felipe's pursuer also climbed the fence and, frustrated in his
attempt to restrain Felipe, tried to hit Mr. Paez, who was standing
near his car (T. 63). Alarmed by what was happening, Mr. Paez got
into his car and drove back to the Amaguer home (T. 63).
The version of the facts reported by the State's witnesses
from the time when Felipe was running toward the fence and Mr. Paez
was standing near his car on the other side differs from the account

given by Mr. Paez.

Mark Canham testified that he saw Felipe hand

the video cassette recorder over the fence to Manuel Paez (T. 36,
37). Mr. Canham testified that he jumped the fence in pursuit of
Felipe, landing on the hood of Mr. Paez's parked car (T. 37). Mr.
Paez, who had the VCR in his arms, looked at Mr. Canham, then threw
the VCR on the ground (T. 37). Mr. Canhaii grabbed Mr. Paez by the
arm, but Mr. Paez jerked away and escaped in his car (T. 37, 38).
Mr. Canham was able to get the license pl&te number of the car (T.
38).
Manuel Paez was charged by information on April 2, 1987,
with Theft by Receiving for his involvement in the incident of March
28, 1987

See Addendum A.
At the jury trial on May 5, 1987, Manuel Paez and Felix

Amaguer testified to Appellant's version of the facts as recited
above.

Lori Nicholson and Mark Canham, t-fcp alleged victims of the

theft, testified further that their home had been burglarized
earlier in the day on March 28, 1987, and that their video cassette
recorder had been taken (T. 28,29).
South Salt Lake City police officer Lee Lindsay verified
that Nicholson and Canham had reported tlje VCR missing, had reported
the sighting of Felipe and Manuel Paez, and had reported the license
number of the car driven by Mr. Paez (T.

51). Officer Lindsay

testified that he had inquired with the Division of Motor Vehicles
and learned that the car Mark Canham saw leavinq the scene was
registered to Manuel Paez (T. 51).

Before the defendant put on his evidence at trial, the
court met with respective counsel in chambers to discuss jury
instructions.

Among other things, the court and counsel agreed that

the jury should be instructed in the language of

Utah Code Ann. §

76-6-408

See addendum B.

(1953 as amended) in regard to intent.

However, when the court instructed the jury, he
substantially altered the statutory language on the element of
intent (T. 71,72).
(T. 86,87).

Mr. Paez objected to the modified instruction

His objection was overruled (T 86,87).

Both counsel

argued extensively on the element of intent in closing.

This

controversial instruction gave rise to both of the issues now raised
by Manuel Paez on appeal.
On May 5, 1987, a jury convicted Manuel Paez of Theft by
Receiving, a Class A misdemeanor.

On June 8, 1987, the Honorable

Floyd H. Gowans, Judge in the Fifth Circuit Court, imposed sentence
on Manuel Paez.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant urges this court to overturn his conviction on
both or either of two grounds.
First, Appellant contends that the trial court erred
reversibly in overruling the defense objection to the court's sua
sponte addition of the words "or should have known" to the statutory
language defining the state of mind required for a finding of guilt
of Theft by Receiving.
Second, Appellant contends that his conviction should be
overturned because it rests on insufficient evidence.

ARGUMENTS

POINT I
MANUEL PASZ'S CONVICTION OF THEFT BY RECEIVING SHOULD BE
REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION AT TRIAL TO THE COURT'S ADDING
THE WORDS "OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THE PROPERTY HAD BEEN
STOLEN" TO THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON THE STATE OF MIND REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION OF
THEFT BY RECEIVING.
Manuel Paez was convicted on May 5, 1987, of the crime of
Theft by Receiving. Mr. Paez contends that the trial court
incorrectly instructed the jury on the elements of Theft by
Receiving.

This error was prejudicial ana requires reversal of the

conviction on appeal.
Mr. Paez prepared and submitted to the trial court proposed
jury instructions.

Among others, Mr. Paelz submitted an instruction

on the elements of the Theft by Receiving.
You must acquit the defendant, Manuel Paez, of Theft by
Receiving unless you find each of the following elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. that on or about March 28, 1987,
2. in Salt Lake County, Utah;
3. Manuel Paez received, retained or
disposed of the property of Lori
Nicholson;
4. that Manuel Paez knew the property
had been stolen or believed it had
been stolen;
5. that Manuel Paez ic^eived the property
with the purpose to deprive Lori
Nicholson of it;
6. that the property was worth more than
$100.00 but less than $250.00.
See Addendum C, instruction No. 5. (Emphasis added)

Before the trial court instructed the jury, the court and
respective counsel discussed proposed instructions in chambers and
off the record.

The court essentially agreed to give defendant's

proposed Instruction No.5.

The court agreed to instruct the jury in

the language of the statute touching the mental state required for
the crime (See addendum

B ):

A person commits theft if he receives, retains
or disposes of the property of another knowing
that it has been stolen, or believing that it
probably has been stolen, . . . with a purpose
to deprive the owner thereof.
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1953 as amended) (Emphasis added).
However, when the court instructed the jury, he
substantially altered the statutory specifications as to state of
mind:
Before you can convict the defendant, Manuel
Paez, (of) the crime of Theft by Receiving, a
Class A disdemeanor, you must find to the
evidence. First, that on or about the 28th
day of March, 1987, in Salt Lake County, Utah,
Manuel Paez received the property of another.
Next, that he did so with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof. Next, that he knew
said property had been stolen or believed
that said property had been stolen or should
have known said property had been stolen. Fifth,
that said property then and there had a value
of more than $100, but less than $250.
T.

71, 72.

(Emphasis added).

The trial court's sua sponte addition of the words "or
should have known said property had been stolen" to the language of
the statute was error*
(T. 86,87).

Defendant objected to the added requirement

The court overruled defendant's objection (T. 86,87).

The court erred reversibly in overruling this objection because the
instruction as given was incorrect and the impact of the incorrect
instruction was indisputably prejudicial.

The state of mind required for Theft by Receiving is
clearly set forth in section 76-6-408 and has been reiterated in
numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
Enacted in 1973, section 76-6-408

plainly expresses the

legislative intent that a person be subject to conviction of Theft
by Receiving only if the facts prove beyorid a
reasonable doubt that he received property knowing it had been
stolen or believing that it probably had been stolen.

The plain

language of the statute limits the class Of offenders susceptible to
conviction to those who know or believe probably.

By its very

specificity as to the state of mind, the statute excludes those who
should have known.
There is no reason to believe that the plain language of
section 76-6-408 is not indicative of legislative intent.

To the

contrary, there is every reason to believte that the statute
expresses the intent of the legislature precisely.

Adopted in 1973,

Section 76-6-408, like most of Utah's cur|rent penal code, is based
on the Model Penal Code.

The comments to the Model Penal Code,

though not adopted or endorsed by Utah's legislature, are useful in
interpreting statutes based on MPC antecedents.

The comments to

section 223.6 of the MPC, section 76-6-408's counterpart, indicate
i

that Theft by Receiving statutes fall into three categories with
respect to the state of mind.

The first group find guilt to exist

only when the accused person can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
to have known the property he received was stolen.

The second group

impute guilt when the evidence establishes that the accused knew or
believed probably that the property was stolen.

The third crroup

imposes liability for negligence, authorizing conviction of the
accused who should have known the property he received was stolen.
Model Penal Code §223.6 (1980) at 238,239.
The comments to the MPC identify Utah's statute as falling
in the middle group. _id. at 238 Footnote 15.
is indisputable.

Surely this assessment

In fact, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah,

acknowledging MPC section 223.6(1) as the model for section
76-6-408, has endorsed the MPC view of Utah's position and the MPC
explanation of the advantages of this position:

Many state legislatures in adopting the Model
Penal Code have inserted the adjective "stolen"
immediately prior to "property of another", thus
negating the Model Penal Code change and making
it clear that the property actually must be
stolen. (References to statutes of other states
omitted). On the other hand, the Utah
legislature, in adopting the Model Penal Code did
not negate the intent of the Code's drafter and
restrict the statute's coverage to stolen
property only. The Utah Criminal Code
Commentary, prepared by Jay V. Barney,
the reporter for Utah's adaptation and adoption
of the Model Penal code, recognized the alternate
mens rea of "believing that it probably has been
stolen" but is otherwise silent on the
character of the subject property J.Barney, Utah
Criminal Code Commentary 187 (1967). We are left,
then, with the plain working of the statute that
the actor must only believe the property to be
stolen and with the legislative intent that the
property need not be stolen in fact, as
articulated by Section 223.6 (comment 4(b)).
State v. Pappas, 705 P.2d 1169, 1170-71 (Utah 1985).
The reasons for the code drafters' favoring the position
taken by Utah are not relevant to the issue at hand.

The point is

that Utah's legislature chose one of three clearly defined,
pre-existing alternative articulations of the state of mind required

for Theft by Receiving.

The trial court should have deferred to the

legislature in instructing the jury on sta|te of mind in the case at
bar.

The trial court's usurption of the legislative function in

adding language imposing a negligence standard was improper.

The

court erred in overruling defendant's obiection to the judicially
amended statutory language.
Appellant's view of the statutory requirement regarding
state of mind as elucidated above is suppdrted by numerous Utah
Supreme Court decisions.

In State v. Powell, 672 P.2d 96 (Utah

1983)/ the defendant appealed his conviction of Theft by Receiving
on the grounds that the stolen property h^ believed he was receiving
was not in fact stolen since it was being used in a sting
operation.

The court held that the state of mind requirement was

met by the actor's actual belief that the property was stolen.

The

state of mind requirement for Theft by Receiving is stated in the
language of 76-6-408 in State v. Murphy, fel7 P.2d 399-401, (Utah
1980).

See also State v. Hill, 727 P.2d J221-223, (Utah 1986).
The instruction on the elements of Theft by Receiving given

to the jury over defendant's objection wais wrong.

Appellant urges

this court to reverse his conviction because the court's error in
incorrectly instructing the jury over his objection was prejudicial.
Error is prejudicial and requirels reversal on appeal
"unless it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would
have convicted even in the absence of error at the trial level".
State v. Chappie, 660

P.2d 1208 (Ariz.1983).

In assessing whether

error is reversible, the crucial question is not whether there is
substantial evidence to support the judgment, but whether the error

affected the judgment.
Cir. 1976).

United States v. Robinson, 544 P.2d 611 (2nd

In State v. Pierre,572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977), the Utah

Supreme Court stressed that a court may reverse a conviction when
the error at trial is such that:

there exists a reasonable
probability or likelihood that there
would have been a result more
favorable to the defendant in
absence of the error.
Id. at 1352.
In the case at bar, there is a reasonable probability or
likelihood that the result would have been more favorable to the
defendant had the jury been properly instructed on the elements of
the crime charged.
It is not possible that the jury ignored or was
uninfluenced by the court's incorrect instruction that a negligence
standard could be applied in establishing a guilty state of mind.
It is not possible, because both counsel argued this issue to the
jury.

The state's argument on this element was extensive and

explicit:
(A)nother thing that Ms. Christianson
said I would like to correct. She
indicated to you that one of the
standards in one of the elements is
that he knew the item was stolen or
believed it was stolen, but the third
one is that she did not recite to you
from the same instruction 'or should
have known that it was stolen'. So
you go one step beyond what she
talked about, so when you read that
instruction, you will find the fact
that it says 'should have known'.
Not that he just may have believed it
to be stolen. But would reasonable
men know or should they have known

that someone is coming over with a VCR over the fence in
the back yard or some other individual, should they have
known it was stolen, certainly that was the case.
T. 83-84.
This argument demonstrates that the application of a
negligence standard in finding

the state of mind required for the

crime was essential to the State's case.
facts.

This is born out by the

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State's position,

the facts tending to show that Mr. Paez knew, believed probably, or
should have known the property was stolen, are that Manuel Paez was
standing on the other side of the fence from the Nicholson-Canham
residence, that he took the VCR from Felipe over the fence, that he
dropped it on the ground, and the

he drove away in his car.

Had

the jury been properly instructed, they may have found, based on the
facts, that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Manuel Paez
knew or believed probably that the VCR was stolen.

There is a

reasonable likelihood that they convicted Mr. Paez only because the
felt he should have known

the VCR was stolen.

In addition to the reasonable likelihood of the jury's
having convicted Mr. Paez on the basis of the court's incorrect
instruction on the elements of the crime, defendant's ability to
defend against the charge at trial was significantly impaired by the
court's erroneous instruction.
Manuel Paez was charged by information with Theft by
Receiving.

The information, couched in the language of 76-6-408,

notified Mr. Paez that he was accused of receiving property "knowing
that the property had been stolen or believing that it had probably
been stolen". See Addendum A.

The information was never amended to

notify Mr. Paez that a negligence standard would apply.

Neither did

the state or the court suggest application of such a standard at any
time before the court instructed the jury on the record on the
elements of the crime.

Manuel Paez was consequently denied the

privilege of defending against the crime of which the jury convicted
him.
The trial court incorrectly, and over defendant's
objection, instructed the jury that the state of mind element for
Theft by Receiving includes the negligence standard expressed by the
phrase "or should have known the property was stolen."

This error

requires reversal of the conviction because "there exists a
reasonable probability or likelihood that there would have been a
result more favorable t the defendant in absence of the error."
Pierre at 1352.
POINT II.

MANUEL PAEZ'S CONVICTION OF THEFT BY
RECEIVING SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE
STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE PROVING
EACH ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT.
The jury in the case at bar found Manuel Paez guilty of
Theft by Receiving.

In order to warrant such a verdict and make it

invulnerable on appeal, the State has the burden of proving each
element of the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the prosecution had to satisfy section 76-6-408 (1) by
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Manuel Paez received,
retained, or disposed of the property of Lori Nicholson; that he
knew the property had been stolen or believed it had probably been

stolen; that he received the property intending to deprive Lori
Nicholson of it; and that the property was worth between $100,00 and
$250.00,
In Utah, a court reviewing a conviction supported by
allegedly insufficient evidence will not usurp the duties of the
fact-finder.

State v. Moon, 688 P.2d 494, 495 (Utah 1984).

This

means the reviewing court will not ordinarily weigh conflicting
evidence or judge the credibility of testimony.
P.2d 811, 813 (Utah 1977).

State v. Logan, 563

The mere existence of contradictory

evidence or of conflicting inferences cannot justify disturbance of
the verdict.

State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).

However, the reviewing court can and must overturn a jury verdict
for insufficiency of the evidence when the evidence is: "so
inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime charged."

State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 (Utah 1980).

See

also State v. Fort, P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1977); State v. Wilson,
565 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 1977); State v. Larsen, 606 P.2d 229, 231
(Utah 1980) .
In reviewing a conviction, the appellate court must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's
verdict.

State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750,751 (Utah 1977).

The

appellate court must find that the jury had sufficient competent,
credible evidence as to each element of the crime to convince a
reasonable person beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
guilt.

Id. inadequate evidence as to any element of the crime

mandates reversal.

State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 695 (Utah 1980).

When a defendant is convicted on circumstantial evidence, the
evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than the
guilt of the defendant. State v.Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,232 (Utah 1980);
State v. Romero, 554

P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).

If the evidence is

insufficient as to any element of the crime, "notwithstanding the
deference due the judgment of the trial court," the appellate court
must reverse the conviction.
P.2d 386 (Utah 1982).

State in the interest of J.S.H., 642

See also State v. Kourbelas, 621 P.2d 1238,

1240 (Utah 1980); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 447 (Utah 1983);
State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980).
Appellant in the case at bar contends that the State
presented insufficient evidence to establish the following beyond a
reasonable doubt:

first, that he knew the property had been stolen

or believed it had probably been stolen; and second, that he
received the property intending to deprive Lori Nicholson of it.
The State did not present any direct evidence to prove that Mr. Paez
knew or believed probably that the VCR was stolen;
light most favorable to the

Viewed in the

State's position, the evidence is that

Mr. Paez took the VCR over the fence from Felipe, that he dropped it
on the ground, and that he left in his car.

This evidence could not

convince reasonable minds beyond a reasonable doubt that Manuel Paez
knew the VCR was stolen at the time that he received it.
Precisely the same evidence is offered to prove that Mr.
Paez intended to deprive Lori Nicholson of the property.

This

evidence simply cannot reasonably be interpreted as establishing
that intent.
The Utah Supreme Court commented on the element of intent
in State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 1980):

We recognize proof of a defendant's intent is rarely
susceptible of direct proof and therefore, the prosecution must rely on a combination of direct and
circumstantial evidence to establish this element.
However/ criminal convictions may not be based upon
conjectures or probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum
of evidence concerning each element of the crime as
charged from which the jury may base its conclusion
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Citations omitted).
Murphy at 402.
In Murphy, the Utah Supreme Court refused to indulge the
jury's inference of intent to deprive an owner of possession of his
property from evidence that Mr. Murphy received property from
another knowing or believing at the time of receipt that it was
stolen,

^id at 403.

The Court found that Mr. Murphy should have

been acquitted as a matter of law because the essential element of
intent was not proved.
Intent is most credibly inferred from direct evidence of
what a defendant said and did.
(Utah 1967).
evidence.

State v. Canfield, 422 P.2d 196, 198

Intent may also be inferred from circumstantial

State v. Cooly, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1979).

In the

case of State v. Kennedy, 616 P.2d 594, 598 (Utah 1980), for
example, the State Supreme Court upheld an inference of defendant's
intent to arouse the sexual desires of the men he brought home to
his wife from the fact that he forced her to have sex with them; the
intent to arouse and gratify his own sexual desires was properly
inferred from the fact that he listened to recordings of these
forced sexual encounters "over and over again."
Id.

In the present case, the evidence of knowledge or belief
that the property was stolen and of intent to deprive the owner does
not amount to the quantum required to support the jury's verdict of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Appellant urges the appellate

court to reverse his conviction on this basis.

CONCLUSION
On either or both of the grounds discussed above, Appellant
seeks reversal of his conviction and remand of his case to the
circuit court with an order for either dismissal of the charges or a
new trial.

Respectfully submitted this

o

U

t

< ^

day of November, 1987.
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McCaye Christianson
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, MC CAYE CHRISTIANSON,hereby certify that four copies of
the foregoing Appellant's brief will be delivered to the County
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111,
this

b

day of November, 1987.

MC CAYE* CHRISTIANSON
Attorney for Appellant
Delivered by
November, 1987.

this

day of

ADDENDUM A

DAVID E. YOCOM
County Attorney
THOMAS P. VUYK
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

)

Screened by:
Assigned to:
BAIL

T. Vuyk
T. Vuyk

$1,500.00

)

v.

INFORMATION

MANUEL PAEZ

DOB 0 6 / 1 7 / 4 4 ,

)

Criminal No.
)

/0O£?/5MS

Defendant(s).
)

The undersigned L. Lindsay - South SLPD under oath states on
information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
THEFT BY RECEIVING, a Class A Misdemeanor, at 2809 South 300 East,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about March 28,
1987, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 408, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
MANUEL PAEZ, a party to the offense, received, retained, or
disposed of the property of Lori Nocholson, knowing that the
property had been stolen or believing that it probably had
been stolen, with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof,
and that the value of said property was more than $100.00,
but did not exceed $250.00;
THIS INFORMATION
WITNESSES:
Dan Barrett

IS BASED

Lee Lindsay

(Continued on page Two)

ON EVIDENCE

OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING

Lori Nicholson

Mark Canham

INFORMATION
STATE v. MANUEL PAEZ
County Attorney #87-1-72279
Page Two
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Complaining officer bases this Information on police report
#87-3291 and personal interviews with Lori Nicholson who stated that
her apartment was broken into and her V.C.R. having a value of
$200.00 was stolen. Mark Canhara who stated he viewed the defendant
being handed the V.C.R. over the fence by an unidentified man. When
Mr. Canham tried to apprehend the defendant he fled in his vehicle.
Mr. Canham got the license number and made a positive identification
of the defendant.

ADDENDUM B

A F F I D A V IT

THE STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

1.

I have been an Manuel Paez's attorney throughout the

legal proceedings in the Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals in
case number 870279CA;
2.

In the course of the trial of this case on May 5,

1987/ the court and respective counsel discussed proposed jury
instructions in chambers and without a reporter present;
3.

In that conversation, the court explicitly stated that

he would instruct the jury that one element of the crime of Theft by
Receiving is that the actor have received property knowing that the
property had been stolen or believing that it had probably been
stolen.

4.

When I objected to the modified version of this

instruction which the court gave to the jury, he overruled my
objection and told me to wait to put it on the record at the
conclusion of the trial.

This practice is known as "reserving

objections to jury instructions" and is common in Circuit Court
proceedings.
DATED this

*3)

day of November, 1987.

r\c To„. ~ C 0 — ^ ^ ^ ° ^ — "
MCCAYE ICHRfSTIANSON
Attorney at Law
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc,
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this J2

day of

November, 1987.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in Salt Lake County
My Commission Expires:

ADDENDUM C

MCCAYE CHRISTIANSON
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
532-5444
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,

:
:

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

Plaintiff
v.

:

MANUEL PAEZ,

:

Case No. 871002815MS

Defendant
The defendant, MANUEL PAEZ, by and through his attorney of
record, MCCAYE CHRISTIANSON, hereby requests this Court in its
charge to the jury to submit Instruction Nos. 1 through
inclusive,
DATED this

£

day of May, 1987.

n. / ^ ^ io^r
flu^c ^ o W > c

MCCAYE CHRISTIANSON
Attorney for Defendant

RECEIVED a copy of the foregoing Instructions to the Jury
this

day of April, 1987.

INSTRUCTION NO.

^

You must acquit the defendant, Manuel Paez, of Theft by
Receiving unless you find each of the following elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt:
1.

that on or about March 28, 1987,

2.

In Salt Lake County, Utah;

3.

Manuel Paez received, retained, or disposed of the

property of Manuel- Fa^-a;
4.

That Manuel Paez knew the property had been stolen or

that he believed it had probably been stolen;
5.

That Manuel Paez received the property with the purpose

to deprive Lori Nicholson of it;
6.

That the property was worth more than $100.00 but less

than $250.00.

